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The claim I defend in this article is this: With some few exceptions, no one can 
be held morally responsible for the global financial crisis that started in 2007. Or 
a bit more precisely: a received and a novel approach to individual moral respon-
sibility, and two plausible candidates for collective moral responsibility, allow us 
to assign responsibility to only a small class of people or corporate entities.
This claim will strike many as prima facie highly implausible. Even though 
there is a fair amount of disagreement between people about whether an indi-
vidual can be held morally responsible for climate change and environmental 
degradation (the car driver may or may not be responsible), there is very little 
disagreement about individual moral responsibility and the global financial crisis 
(at least some bankers and/or banks are, most people think, responsible). It is, 
therefore, important to qualify the scope of my claim and the argumentative 
strategies I use, as well as the underlying aim I have with this article.
To start with the latter, the bigger aim of this article is to see how 
various concepts of moral responsibility fare if applied to large and complex 
phenomena such as a financial crisis (or climate change). One might think 
that the literature on moral responsibility and climate change offers the tools 
needed to approach this generally. But as I show in this article, finance offers 
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a number of additional and puzzling complexities. To establish this, I choose 
two concepts of moral responsibility that reach different conclusion regarding 
environmental degradation, and show that they yield (almost!) the same con-
clusion regarding finance. I pit a fairly received concept used by such authors 
as Baylor Johnson (Johnson 2003) and Walter Sinnott- Armstrong (Sinnott- 
Armstrong 2006) against a contending approach pioneered by Matthew Braham 
and Martin van Hees (Braham and van Hees 2012).1
It is perhaps tempting to retort that a far more plausible account of 
moral responsibility for large- scale events should zoom in on collective rather 
than individual responsibility. This is indeed tempting, but I don’t think it would 
help. I discuss two of the most prominent accounts (one based on plural subject 
theory, the other using the discursive dilemma), and argue that both fail for 
reasons that probably generalize to other accounts of collective responsibility.
Some disclaimers are in place. First, finance is extremely diverse, and 
I cannot hope to defend my claim by individually considering risk managers, 
attorneys, communications officers, traders, analysts, cashiers, depositors, mort-
gage borrowers, and so forth, or the teams or corporate entities they comprise. 
That is why I focus on key participants in the main causes of crises: traders 
in bubbles. Sadly, however, economists only have limited knowledge of the 
causes of bubbles and crises, and this makes any assignment of moral respon-
sibility in finance tentative. Even though I only use well- corroborated models 
that are widely held in high regard by economists, progress in economics 
might force me to revise my arguments at some point.
Again, let me concede at the outset that there will be some exceptions 
to my claim: some individuals and teams will of course turn out to bear 
moral responsibility for large- scale events. If my argument didn’t allow for 
such exceptions, it would be vulnerable to an easy reductio; for clearly some 
mortgage brokers, credit rating analysts, central bank employees, economists, 
supervisory authorities, traders, house owners, business school professors and 
politicians (to name a few) lied or misled customers or salespeople, misman-
aged funds, deliberately employed skewed asset- pricing models, failed to listen 
to potential informants, and manipulated markets. I certainly don’t want to 
deny the significance of these exceptions. I believe that much too little has 
been done so far to bring wrongdoers to justice. But their number is fairly 
small, and an analysis of their responsibility is unlikely to yield insights with 
broader philosophical relevance. That is why I don’t consider them here.
I proceed as follows. In Section 2, I consider individual responsibility. 
I briefly introduce the relevant factual background (economic models of the 
crisis) and the two competing conceptions of moral responsibility. Discussing 
two cases (of a private and an institutional investor), I show that the received 
approach holds no one responsible. Applying the novel account due to Braham 
and van Hees (2012), however, leads to the perhaps surprising conclusion 
that the private investor, rather than institutional investors, is morally 
1. Surely one might think that still other concepts of moral responsibility would lead to 
different verdicts. But I believe that my argument extends to many alternative concepts.
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responsible for the harms resulting from a bubble’s bursting. In Section 3, I 
consider plural subject and discursive dilemma approaches to collective respon-
sibility, and show that neither of them works. In Section 4, I critically examine 
the principle that wherever there is harm there is someone who must bear 
the blame, and I also consider the role of regulators and governments.
2. INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY
It is standard in economics to distinguish the run- up phase—the bubble—from 
the actual crisis. Using Hyman Minsky’s (1982) widely used terminology, the 
run- up phase consists of five “moments.” The first is displacement, where 
innovation changes expectations among investors. Innovation may be techno-
logical (think of the advent of the railroads in the United States and the 
subsequent railroad bond bubbles), but it may equally be financial innovation, 
often spurred by regulatory change (such as the development of securitization 
before the global financial crisis). Then, investors start buying new assets, 
leading to a boom. It is here, or in the ensuing third moment of euphoria, 
that the price of the assets will start surpassing their fundamental value; they 
will become “overpriced.” Some investors may already suspect a bubble, and 
may try to pass on the assets to “another fool,” as popular parlance has it, 
but only in the fourth moment of profit taking, rational or “sophisticated” 
investors will start selling their assets consistently, which sooner or later trig-
gers a panic where everyone tries to dump the assets.
The subprime mortgage meltdown offers an illustration. Low interest rates, 
financial innovation (mortgage securitization in the form of asset- backed securities), 
and a global savings glut gave rise to a real estate bubble that started bursting 
in 2007. This is where the global financial crisis began. Crises are typically caused 
by small events. The subprime mortgage market amounted to only 4 percent of 
the entire mortgage market. How can a small bubble cause such a harmful crisis? 
The received answer is that small events cause crises in the presence of amplifica-
tion mechanisms. A small event may have direct spillover effects owing to contracts 
between individuals or organizations “inside” and “outside” the event. If, for 
instance, a subprime borrower defaults on her mortgage and is declared bankrupt, 
some of her creditors (say, the plumber or vendor of a new sofa) may incur 
losses because they have to write off the debt. If a vendor happens to have done 
business with many defaulting subprime lenders, the vendor may have to file for 
bankruptcy herself too, which may in turn entail that she is no longer able to 
discharge her contractual obligations vis- à- vis still other individuals. And so on. 
But small events may also have indirect spillover effects. Here, the amplification 
operates through prices. If subprime loans start defaulting more than expected, 
the price of mortgage- backed securities decreases, perhaps even to the point of 
a so- called fire sale where they are dumped on the market. As a result, the 
financial position of owners of such securities will ceteris paribus decrease. If you 
own such securities, even if you are totally unconnected to the events that caused 
the fire sale, the value of your assets (and so your “net worth”) decreases.
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Case 1: Selling Your House
You have been lucky enough to find a permanent job in a small university 
town that you really enjoy. You are renting a flat, but consider buying a house 
since you have become convinced that you want to stay in this place for at 
least the next ten years. You find a nice house at a convenient distance from 
where you work, which you decide to buy. After two or three years, you start 
noticing that the local newspaper publishes articles now and then that claim 
that house prices in your town (and country) have been too high in the last 
five years. They make clear that a significant drop in price is expected sooner 
or later. You find this plausible because two houses in your neighborhood were 
recently sold for about 20 percent more than you paid for your very similar 
house. You are concerned that in a few years from now your house may be 
worth less than what you paid for it. You realize that this would make it dif-
ficult or even impossible to move to a different place in the next five years 
or so, and even though you don’t want to do that, the mere thought that your 
options might be limited makes you nervous. After a third house in your 
neighborhood is sold at a high price, you decide to put your house on the 
market. It sells shortly after, 35 percent above what you paid for it. You repay 
your mortgage, save the rest, and rent a nice flat. Not even a month later, 
you read that house prices have started plunging. One of your former neighbors, 
an elderly woman that had moved into the neighborhood a decade ago, had 
to put her house up for sale as she was moving into a retirement home. She 
sold it at 80 percent of what she paid for it ten years ago.
Are you morally responsible for your neighbor’s losses?
Here are the key elements shared by the two concepts of moral respon-
sibility I discuss in this article. An agent S is responsible for selecting action 
A, resulting in a state of affairs C, whenever three conditions are satisfied:
(i) Autonomy: S’s performing A must be the result of autonomous, 
voluntary, and intentional choice;
(ii) Causality: S’s performing A must be (part of) a cause of state of affairs C;
(iii) Alternative: S must have had the opportunity to select an alternative 
action B evading C.2 
Your selling your house is certainly the result of autonomous, voluntary, and 
intentional deliberation. You considered the matter intensely and rationally. 
There was no force or compulsion, nor were you under the sway of any 
cognitive or behavioral biases when you sold your house. So, the first condi-
tion is unproblematic. It is less clear, however, whether selling your house 
was a relevant causal factor explaining why your former neighbor sold her 
house at a significant loss. An answer to that question will depend on the 
explanatory model (a question for the economists) as well as on the concept 
of causality (a philosophical question that the received and the contending 
approach to moral responsibility used in this article disagree on).
2. Surely, there are many different accounts of responsibility, but I’m going to ignore that 
here. See Tognazzini (2013).
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Explanatory Model
Now the question about economics already causes some trouble. For an economist 
wedded to the view that economic behavior must be explained through models 
postulating rational agents only (maximizing their expected utility), bubbles seems 
impossible to understand. This is why: In a bubble, the price of an asset surpasses 
its fundamental value, a concept meant to capture the asset’s intrinsic value, typi-
cally defined as the sum of future cash flows the asset generates, discounted to 
the present.3 Each rational agent sees that no one wants to own an overpriced 
asset at a point in time t after which there will be no opportunity to trade any 
further. But then, a rational agent will argue, this asset cannot be overpriced at 
a point in time s < t, because no rational agent would want to buy it for that 
price at s. Reasoning backwards, it becomes clear that there won’t be any moment 
where an asset is overpriced, that is, exceeds its fundamental value.4
Yet rationality doesn’t so easily absolve an agent from moral responsibility. 
More sophisticated models show that bubbles may arise out of the joint actions 
of rational and irrational agents (or even among rational agents only) if uncer-
tainty is introduced. In such models, these bubbles arise if rational agents are 
uncertain about the presence and behavior of potentially irrational investors, or 
about whether the price of an asset is greater than its fundamental value (and 
also when they are uncertain about whether other rational investors are uncertain 
about these things). In such circumstances, rational investors may find it worth-
while to buy and hold assets during what they perceive as a bubble, at least for 
some time, because they may expect two sorts of investors to hold on to the 
asset for even longer: rational investors that were slower to realize the overpric-
ing, and irrational investors that are unaware of the overpricing. Such investors, 
in sum, try to “calculate… the madness of people,” as Isaac Newton once said.5
A simplified model of a bubble therefore looks as follows:
(i) The price of a certain asset M increases over time, surpassing its 
fundamental value at point in time t;
(ii) At some point t + δ1, the first investor becomes aware of the fact 
that M is overpriced, until at t + δn all n rational or sophisticated 
investors know M is overpriced;
(iii) The price of M continues to rise up to a point t + ε with ε > δn, 
with increasingly many investors selling M, so that after t  +  ε it 
drops sharply, bursting the bubble. Here also unsophisticated investors 
will know about M’s being overpriced.6 
3. Estimating fundamental value is notoriously difficult due to uncertainty about the future 
cash flows and the interest rates to be used for discounting.
4. Formally, this is a so- called backwards induction argument based on common knowledge.
5. Newton is said to have remarked that “I can calculate the motions of the heavenly bodies, 
but not the madness of people,” but the attribution is disputed. There is no doubt, however, that 
he lost part of his fortune in the South Sea bubble of 1720.
6. This is closely inspired by the model of Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003).
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But what explains why prices start plummeting at t + ε? Prices reflect supply 
and demand. My selling an asset marginally depresses its price. Up to t + ε, 
the effect of my selling M is offset by a larger demand for M. At and after 
t + ε, however, rational investors (and later, we may assume, most other 
investors) attempt to get rid of M, depressing M’s price.7
Causality
If I sold close enough to t + ε, it may seem that I contributed causally to 
the bubble’s bursting. But whether my contribution mattered for moral respon-
sibility depends not only on the explanatory model, but also on what we take 
it to mean to make a causal contribution in relation to moral responsibility. 
Take, for instance, the received idea that for an agent to be a relevant causal 
factor, he or she needs to make a difference. Then, you are clearly off the 
hook, for you only sold one house. You didn’t make the difference: even if 
you had decided not to sell your house, the crisis would still have hit, and 
your neighbor would still have lost money selling her house.
The idea that being able to make a difference is necessary for you to 
be morally responsible underlies typical judgments of responsibility for climate 
change, and it may be tempting to apply these ideas to other large- scale 
events. Authors such as Johnson (2003) and Sinnott- Armstrong (2006) have 
argued that a person’s driving a car doesn’t make her morally responsible 
for environmental degradation. If their arguments are successful and applicable 
to finance, the conclusion is that you were not morally responsible for your 
neighbor’s losses.
But things are less straightforward. The model that explains the causal 
contribution an individual car driver makes to environmental degradation is 
the tragedy of the commons.8 Such tragedies arise when individuals overuse 
publicly available but scarce resources. In the original idea, developed by Garrett 
Hardin (1968), common (Lat. communia) refers to a patch of land belonging 
to all members of a certain community, where farmers graze their cows, but 
where increasing numbers of grazing cows ultimately deplete the resources. 
Negatively answering the question of whether the individual farmer (or car 
driver) can be held responsible for the depletion, Johnson and Sinnott- Armstrong 
argue that it is unreasonable for the individual farmer or car owner to hope 
that by switching to alternatives (fewer cows, public transport, etc.) she would 
help saving the common or the planet. Their individual marginal contribution 
is too small, the argument seems to say, to make a serious contribution.
Johnson and Sinnott- Armstrong have, however, recently been challenged 
by Braham and van Hees (2012). These authors argue that marginal contributions 
do not free you from responsibility.9 They take issue with the assumption that 
7. More precisely, it is a small time interval rather than an infinitesimal point in time.
8. The tragedy of the commons is a standard model of climate change. See, e.g., The Stern 
Review (Stern 2007).
9. It may seem their approach rides on an equivocation between being “partly” and “fully” 
responsible for something. I hope to show that theirs is richer and more complex, though.
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for an agent S to be a causal factor for some state of affairs C, S has to have 
had a genuine alternative B that ensures that C does not arise. Arguing that 
that condition is too strong, Braham and van Hees propose to apply the NESS 
test (plus a criterion about Reasonable Alternatives that I’ll discuss shortly).10
 According to the NESS test, an agent S’s performing action A is a 
causal factor for C if and only if A was a necessary element of a set of 
conditions that are jointly sufficient to cause C.11
 It is not sufficient for you to be absolved from responsibility for C to 
claim that you had no opportunity to rule out C. You must show that there 
is an action available to you that would have avoided the outcome, had suf-
ficiently many others concurred. A result of this is that, unlike Johnson and 
Sinnott- Armstrong, Braham and van Hees do find the car driver a causal 
factor for environmental degradation. The reason is that although his or her 
own decision not to drive a car does not avoid the negative effects of emit-
ting carbon dioxide, it allegedly would if sufficiently many others adopted an 
alternative course of action (bicycles, public transport, etc.). Back to the case, 
then, following Braham and van Hees: that you sold your house is causally 
relevant to your neighbor’s losing money. The argument is this: As the above 
model makes clear, a bubble arises when sufficiently many people start selling 
overpriced assets. One seller doesn’t make a bubble burst, and two or three 
won’t burst the bubble either. But at some point, the added seller does make 
the difference. So a house seller is a necessary member of a jointly sufficient 
set of people selling their houses, thereby causing the housing bubble to 
collapse.12
10. The NESS test is due to Hart and Honoré (1985), but may go back at least as far as to John 
Stuart Mill. The originality of Braham and van Hees’s contribution is not so much the introduction 
of the NESS test. Rather what distinguishes their approach from others is that they have developed 
a general game- theoretic model that gives a precise account of moral responsibility in contexts in 
which your actions have consequences that depend on those of others.
11. With more precision, suppose each agent j performs action aj with a resulting outcome C. 
Then, i’s performing ai is causally relevant to C whenever there is a subset T of all agents satisfying 
the following conditions: (i) i is a member of T; (ii) whatever actions the members outside T select, 
if all members of T select aj, then C results; (iii) if all members of T stick to selecting aj except for 
i, then the members outside T can select at least one combination of actions ensuring that C does 
not arise. If these conditions are met, whether or not T succeeds in causing C hinges on i.
12. It might look as though I implicitly assume that the tragedy of the commons is an adequate 
model of financial bubbles and crises. I don’t. But bubbles do share one important characteristic 
with such tragedies: an individual agent’s action leads to negative externalities on another agent’s 
utility, and these negative externalities are not internalized by the agent. Formally, if some 
agent i performs an action ai, and agent j performs aj, then the utility for j will be uj(ai, aj), so that 
changes in i’s behavior lead to marginal externalities 
휕uj(ai ,aj)
휕ai
. It is crucial to note, however, that 
in finance these negative externalities operate through prices rather than through physical 
pollution, as in the example of the car driver. This has important repercussions for the question of 
whether moral responsibility entails blameworthiness (or whether morally responsible individuals 
should be held legally liable for these negative externalities). It has, I believe, higher prima facie 
plausibility to derive a rights infringement from physical damage than from depressed prices, for 
instance.
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Alternative
You acted autonomously and intentionally, but whether you were a causal 
factor contributing to your neighbor’s losing money depends on the concept 
of causal relevance. Following the received view of moral responsibility, you 
are already off the hook. The ultimate judgment about moral responsibility 
following Braham and van Hees, however, boils down to the issue of the 
third condition concerning the availability of an alternative.
Generally, any alternative doesn’t suffice. The alternative should be rea-
sonable, eligible, morally and/or legally acceptable, and so on. That you had 
an alternative is clear: you could have stayed in the house. Is that a reason-
able alternative following Braham and van Hees? Let’s quickly go back to 
their analysis of the tragedy of the commons. By grazing cattle (or driving 
a car), I contribute to the depletion of resources. Braham and van Hees give 
examples of situations where despite my being a causal factor, I am not 
morally responsible because I didn’t have a reasonable alternative: “if not 
sending any of his livestock to the commons means that a farmer and his 
family will starve to death for lack of income or food, then it is not reason-
able to demand that he do so” (Braham and van Hees 2012). Similarly, they 
say, it would be wrong to hold someone morally responsible for some amount 
of pollution if it were caused by them driving someone to the emergency 
room. “Frivolous” pollution, however, makes you morally responsible (Braham 
and van Hees 2012). They postulate, moreover, that what counts as (un)
reasonable also depends on moral and legal customs: an action is unreason-
able if it is ruled out by morality or law.13 In sum, for an alternative to be 
reasonable, it must not be an inadequate response to a situation that seriously 
threatens someone’s health or life; it must be acceptable given sufficiently 
widely accepted moral standards; and it must be acceptable given the laws 
that are effective in the situation at hand. A result of this is that if some 
action is an unreasonable alternative in a certain decision situation, it is highly 
unlikely that agents placed in such a situation will choose that alternative 
because they generally try to avert life- threatening situations, and to avoid 
breaking moral and legal norms.14
Back to the case. Although in your neighborhood three people moved 
before you moved, most of your neighbors didn’t sell their houses. The details 
of their decision situations may be a bit different from yours, but grosso 
modo there will be many similarities: most neighbors will, like you, have had 
no plans to change jobs or change places in the next five years or so. Most 
neighbors will have had some sense of house price developments, as many 
subscribed to the local newspaper. And all neighbors will, like you, have had 
some interest in avoiding a drop in their net financial position. So if you try 
to defend yourself by claiming that it would be unreasonable not to move, 
13. I will here set aside the issue of whether this is always a plausible condition.
14. I should stress that this is an empirical claim. It doesn’t follow from Braham and van 
Hees’s definitions, but is consistent with them.
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then you’ll have to explain why so many people in your neighborhood (as 
well as in many others) chose to select precisely that unreasonable action.
I don’t think that this can be consistently done. So, the upshot is that 
if you adopt a received approach to moral responsibility (such as those of 
Johnson or Sinnott- Armstrong), then you are not morally responsible for your 
neighbor’s losses. With Braham and van Hees’s approach, however, you are, 
because you made an autonomous choice to sell your house. Selling your 
house was a causal factor in decreasing the price of the house of your neigh-
bor. The alternative of not moving was reasonable. So you are morally respon-
sible for the neighbor’s losses.
Case 2: Retirement Planning
Many people will find it decidedly counterintuitive to hold you morally respon-
sible for your neighbor’s losses, and point out that the condition of causal 
relevance that Braham and van Hees introduce is just too strong. Consider, 
then, the following case.
You are a fund manager for AgriPension, a pension fund actively man-
aging the retirement plans of farmers and other workers in the agricultural 
sector. It is your task to analyze the ICT industry, and buy and sell securities. 
You have bought shares in a number of mid- sized software companies devel-
oping social media and cloud computing solutions for individual and business 
customers. After some time, you start noticing that professional magazines 
and the financial press publish news that earlier expectations about innovation 
in this area were probably overblown. The development of social media and 
cloud computing is hampered by stricter forms of regulation that make it 
difficult for mid- size companies to compete with large companies. With hind-
sight, asset prices in mid- sized ICT have been too high in the past five years, 
and a significant drop must be expected sooner or later. You find this plausible 
because you have witnessed a rather steep rise in price over the past years, 
and you become concerned that in a few years from now these assets may 
be worth less than what you paid for them. You realize that this would lead 
to significant losses that would make it necessary to downsize pension pay-
ments. When you see that several other large investors are starting to sell 
mid- size ICT stock, you decide to get rid of all such shares the pension fund 
owns. Not even a month later, the ICT bubble bursts. The pension fund 
UniPension, responsible for the pensions of university personnel, turns out to 
be too late, and loses about three quarters of the value of ICT stock. University 
personnel face lower pensions as a result.
Consider the three conditions of moral responsibility: autonomy, causality, 
and alternative. This case and the previous should lead to the same judgment 
concerning the first two conditions. In both cases, you acted autonomously, 
and their causal structures are identical (they are both bubbles). If we follow 
the received view and say that the causality condition doesn’t hold, the con-
clusion should be that a fortiori divesting (selling) in the run- up phase of a 
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crisis does not make you morally responsible for the bursting of the bubble. 
To put it somewhat boldly: if an individual car driver is not responsible for 
climate change, then a trader isn’t responsible for the crisis. This is undeniably 
a conclusion that many people find unwelcome, or at least unexpected. I’m 
not going to spend more time on it, though, and want to continue by looking 
at whether Braham and van Hees challenge the incumbent view here, too.
So does accepting Braham and van Hees’s criterion of causal relevance 
commit us to the verdict that AgriPension’s fund manager is morally respon-
sible for the lower pensions of university professors? We shall see the answer 
is negative. There is an interesting twist once we move to the case of the 
professional or institutional trader: the pension fund manager does not have 
a reasonable alternative.
Alternative
The first observation is that there are many different types of investors. I make 
the simple distinction between private investors, who trade for their own profit 
and trade rather small amounts of money, and institutional investors, who trade 
large sums of money to make profit for other people. Institutional investors 
work for insurance companies, university endowments, pension funds, mutual 
funds, and the like. The fund manager from the case is a clear example. Her 
main task is to ensure a particular return, given a level of acceptable risk that 
is determined by the purposes of the fund (in this case arguably the long- term 
ability to pay out pensions requires stability and fairly low risk). A fund man-
ager’s activities are governed by legal obligations that are part of her contract 
with her employer, and reflect the content of contracts between her employer 
and their clients (the members of the fund). Some may argue that in addition 
to these legal obligations she is bound by moral obligations that arise out of 
the informational asymmetries between the fund manager and her clients, or 
from the relative vulnerability of the client, and so on (in the jargon, these 
might be the fiduciary duties agents have vis- à- vis the principals they work for).
Such fund managers buy assets for a variety of reasons. One reason is 
of course that shares may pay dividends. An often more powerful reason is 
to generate returns by buying now and selling later. Suppose you believe that 
XYZ stock is underpriced at the moment. If you buy now, then when others 
have also become aware of the true value of XYZ (and the price has risen 
compared to when you bought it), you have made a gain for your clients. 
But dividend and expected returns don’t exhaust the fund manager’s reasons. 
Every fund manager will also buy a variety of assets simply because she wants 
to diversify the portfolio. Diversifying decreases risk. It is better to have shares 
in two food companies than in one, and it is even better to have shares in 
these two food companies plus a pharmaceutical company, and so forth.15
15. The standard analogy to explain is that you shouldn’t put all your eggs in one basket (see, 
e.g., Fabozzi, Modigliani, and Jones 2009 for a textbook explanation). There are various other 
reasons for buying or selling securities, such as legal or moral proscriptions against owning stocks 
(or bonds) of certain characteristics. I ignore these factors here.
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A fund manager will have to make buying and selling decisions concern-
ing many different shares, and even though she will continuously monitor the 
composition (diversification) of her portfolio, it is practically impossible that 
she can avoid buying assets that, at a later point in time, turn out to be 
overpriced (and as a result may be part of a bubble). So the question we 
need to answer is: Which reasonable options are available to an investor once 
she discovers at t + δi that she owns an overpriced asset M? There are two 
things to do: sell them, or hold on to them.16 Selling them may precipitate 
a bubble’s collapse. This she certainly knows, and since she is an institutional 
investor she may even manage a sufficiently large number of shares for the 
selling of her positions in M to have an immediate noticeable effect on M’s 
price. But as we learned from the earlier discussion of models of bubbles, 
the fund manager doesn’t know whether other investors know about M’s 
being overpriced. For all she knows, she may be early, average, or late. Of 
course she knows that if she is early, her selling M now is much less likely 
to lead to an immediate collapse than if she were the last to learn. But 
equally, she knows that if she holds on to the asset until after the bubble 
has burst, she will not have made a contribution to the bubble’s bursting.
But is holding M a reasonable alternative? Above I argued that if an 
action is unreasonable, we should expect to find only a few people selecting 
it.17 The converse is not generally true. There are reasonable alternatives that 
few people select. Still, what happens if one imagines an action’s being per-
formed by many people or in many circumstances tells you something about 
its reasonability? Since the fund manager will have to deal with overpriced 
assets in the fund’s portfolio fairly regularly, we can consider what long- term 
strategies she (and other fund managers) have at their disposal. Or, to ham-
mer this point home, if we restricted attention to the individual case, we would 
risk losing track of the fact that fund managers adopt investment strategies, 
and that we should ask whether, as a general rule, the strategy of holding on 
to assets in light of information of them being overpriced is a reasonable 
strategy.
It isn’t. An asset manager who never sells overpriced assets will in the 
majority of cases lose money—money that she is typically required by law 
to invest in the best interests of her clients. If clients learn that the fund is 
using the strategy of never selling overpriced assets, they will want to leave 
16. Quitting jobs is surely a reasonable available option, but its availability doesn’t show that 
the other options are unreasonable. If the only reasonable option available to a fund manager 
discovering she owns an overpriced asset is quitting jobs, financial markets would look very 
different. For if that is among the risks fund managers run, they would want to be compensated, 
or find employment in different industries.
17. You might wonder whether such things as large credit card indebtedness shows that many 
people are unreasonable after all. But Braham and van Hees’ definition of reasonableness is more 
permissive than such concepts as economic rationality and prudence. If my empirical claim holds 
true, an unreasonable action is largely an action that is obviously threatening a person’s existence, 
or illegal, or immoral. Taking on too much credit card debt is, then, a reasonable option according 
to this definition.
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the fund.18 The fund will dry up. It doesn’t make sense to invest in such a 
fund, because one is likely to lose one’s money in the long run.
There is a further complexity. The fund manager is assumed in the earlier 
models to have gained knowledge about the difference between the asset’s price 
and fundamental value. But knowledge is hard to get. More often than not, 
managers will be confronted with competing bits of evidence, which it is dif-
ficult to sort out. They may have some reasons to believe M is overpriced, 
but there may also be evidence that the innovations in the respective company 
are so radical that it is almost impossible to estimate future cash flows. So is 
M really overpriced? If the fund manager announced that she will hold on to 
an asset once she gets some evidence that it is overpriced, she will probably 
stop trading, because there is very often at least some evidence backing any 
asset’s being overpriced. Then, she will no longer be running an actively man-
aged fund, but a passive collection of shares, just like an index fund. Clients 
will walk away, because they will want to move their money to a much cheaper 
index fund. (They don’t want to pay fees to the fund manager for doing noth-
ing.) That is why the general strategy holding on to assets that managers per-
ceive as possibly overpriced is unreasonable for actively managed funds.
Back again to the case. You were morally responsible for the losses 
incurred by your neighbor when she sold her house, following Braham and 
van Hees. You weren’t if you accepted the incumbent account. On both 
accounts, however, the fund manager fails to be morally responsible for the 
decreased value of the pensions of university personnel. What general conclu-
sion should this lead to?
A philosophical analysis of cases has the advantage of allowing for a 
high degree of precision in argumentation. But cases have the disadvantage 
that they may only capture a small part of reality. There is, however, con-
siderable reason to doubt whether that is going to be the case here. Most 
economists agree that it is primarily through bubbles that crises start. The 
details of the bubbles may be very different, but their structure is the same. 
That is why I believe that the results from this section support the claim 
that moral responsibility for the global financial crisis among finance profes-
sionals is much smaller than many have thought.
3. COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY
That holding individuals morally responsible for the global financial crisis 
hardly ever makes sense may perhaps be less surprising if we note that most 
people work in teams (or larger groups) rather than individually, and that 
such groups might be meaningful carriers of moral responsibility. If this is 
right, a more successful account of moral responsibility for the crisis may 
emphasize groups rather than individuals.
18. In many countries, pension fund membership is involuntary. This raises the additional 
moral question of whether the fund manager’s refusal to sell overpriced assets wrongs the fund’s 
members.
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My aim in this section is to lower expectations about such an account. 
I focus on two popular ways in which collective responsibility has been applied 
to business. The first is based on Margaret Gilbert’s (1989) plural subject 
theory, which James Dempsey (in this issue) has used to argue that a bank-
ing culture prioritizing profit making over risk management should be held 
morally responsible for the crisis. The second takes the so- called discursive 
dilemma as its point of departure (Pettit 2007). A discursive dilemma is a 
situation in which a team selects a course of action (or brings a verdict on 
some subject matter) that its members do not individually support. If such 
dilemmas are common in finance, one might be led to think that collectives 
can be held morally responsible for outcomes for which individuals cannot.
Both lines of reasoning, however, are committed to making assumptions 
that are implausible on empirical and conceptual grounds; and while I could 
certainly choose other approaches to collective responsibility, I believe my 
arguments generalize sufficiently to undercut ascriptions of collective respon-
sibility for the global financial crisis.19 Or so I argue.
3.1 Plural Subject Theory
Some definitions first. For a collection of people to constitute a plural subject 
there has to be common knowledge among them of the fact that all of them 
have openly expressed their quasi- readiness to engage in certain joint activi-
ties or to embrace, as a group, a particular set of values (Gilbert 1989). 
Common knowledge here refers to something being entirely transparent to 
all group members in the sense that all members know that it is the case, 
and also know that the others possess knowledge concerning it, that they 
know that they know it, and so on. Common knowledge is what typically 
arises when a member of parliament makes a statement during a meeting of 
a national assembly, where the architectural structure of the assembly room 
allows everyone present to witness not only the statement being made but 
also its being made “openly” in a way generating common knowledge among 
parliamentarians. The concept of quasi-readiness, in turn, captures the idea 
that someone is ready to perform her share of a joint action provided the 
others are quasi- ready too. When I would like to go see a film with you, I 
can express my quasi- readiness by saying such things as “Let’s go to Wall 
Street tonight”; and if you respond by saying “Yes, let’s do that,” a plural 
subject with respect to going to the cinema has been formed instantaneously. 
This is not a mere play of words; creating a plural subject creates joint com-
mitments. If I don’t show up at the cinema, I have failed to discharge my 
commitment to perform my share of the joint activities of the plural subject. 
19. Many other approaches to collective action exist, and I can’t do justice to all. Seumas 
Miller (2010) has developed an alternative account of collective responsibility. He applies this to 
a very specific kind of wrongdoing: corruption in finance. Corruption is ruled out by law in most 
countries, so it is relatively unsurprising that some corporate entities are collectively responsible 
for corruption (if one assumes that collective responsibility is a sensible concept). By contrast, I 
focus on activities that are neither illegal nor clearly immoral, in particular asset trading.
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I have failed to live up to what I committed to when I expressed my quasi- 
readiness and you accepted my invitation to form a plural subject.20
Here are the main propositions I am going to reject: that within finance 
there are sufficiently many relevant groups constituting a plural subject collectively 
embracing the value of prioritizing profit over risk management; and that by 
habitually engaging in practices and activities revealing this value, people working 
in finance openly express their quasi- readiness to a joint commitment to embrac-
ing this value, thereby forming or joining the relevant plural subject. My argument 
is in two parts. First, I argue that common knowledge of the required sort is 
unlikely to arise. Second, I show that despite its initial plausibility, the claim that 
within finance profit comes before risk management is ultimately untenable.
The first part starts with the observation that common knowledge is 
unlikely to develop if people hardly ever interact. Your quasi- readiness to 
engage in certain activities and to accept joint commitments to embrace par-
ticular values has to be openly expressed. For sustained ascriptions of collective 
values, group members must have sufficiently many opportunities to create 
and reinforce their joint commitments to embrace these values. Now, most 
banks are large organizations with many branches and departments. Employees 
working at a bank’s local branches are mainly concerned with mortgages, small 
and medium- sized business finance, and other small- scale services. At a bank’s 
headquarter, traders, stock market analysts, accountants, macroeconomists, busi-
ness experts, communications advisors, ICT staff, and many other workers are 
primarily focused on their own narrowly described roles. Consequently, most 
bank employees have very little interaction with each other.
This is underscored by the rigidity of most communication channels in banks. 
For instance, the design of a new financial product typically starts at the com-
mercial side of the bank, only to move to the risk management and compliance 
departments at a later stage. A feedback loop generating common knowledge 
may result, but genuine cooperation between the commercial side of a bank and 
its risk management and compliance departments is fairly uncommon.21 If you 
insist on applying plural subject theory to finance, a more accurate way to describe 
a bank is to say that some plural subjects are committed to profit making, and 
others to managing risk. Moreover, there is no natural necessity to divide labor 
so strictly. Commerce, risk management, and compliance could interact more 
intensely. It is not clear, however, that even if we assume that in such a situation 
a genuine plural subject is established (with commitments vis- à- vis values), it would 
be one prioritizing profit over risk management. There is some empirical evidence 
that when organizational structures are more open, and when information concern-
ing products, risks and compliance is shared more widely within teams or the 
bank as a whole, risk management gets higher priority not lower (Jorion 2009).
20. You may dispute whether such group concepts are necessary to explain my obligation to 
show up. It is not my purpose here to criticize Gilbert’s theory of plural subjects. But see de Bruin 
(2009).
21. Strict separation of various communication channels is sometimes required by internal or 
external regulation.
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It might be objected that I am forgetting an important plural subject: 
top management, the real decision makers. Products are designed, risks assessed, 
and compliance checked, but it is still up to management to decide what to 
do. Surely, a board of directors is a much more likely prima facie candidate 
for plural subjecthood. Moreover, it may indeed seem that in some finance 
firms, top management was excessively focused on collateralized debt obliga-
tions, structured investment vehicles, and other potentially risky products, and 
some such firms did indeed suffer larger losses during the global financial 
crisis than firms with more restraint.
Before proceeding, let me first underscore the difficulties measuring a 
firm’s attitude toward risk management. Here is an instructive example. In 
2007, the Swiss bank UBS lost $19 billion on mortgage- backed securities. As 
René Stulz (2008) notes, such a large loss doesn’t necessarily mean flawed 
risk management. A standard way of conducting risk management through 
value at risk (VaR) attempts to diminish risk by ensuring that potential losses 
exceeding a predetermined threshold magnitude will not manifest except in 
1 percent of the cases (for commercial banks), and 5 percent (for investment 
banks). To find out whether VaR has been done right depends not on whether 
actual losses exceeding the threshold have manifested, but on whether they 
have manifested with higher than expected frequency. Assuming that there 
are 252 trading days in a year, excessive losses should be expected to happen 
during two to three days a year (or twelve to thirteen, if allowing for 5 
percent exceptions). In 2007, UBS reported twenty- nine exceptions, where 
two to three would have been expected. It is that observation that supports 
the claim that risk management at UBS was flawed (Jorion 2009).
I now turn to my second point, and show why it is difficult to imagine 
a culture convincingly committed to prioritizing profit over risk management, 
even though individual managers may have had incentives to disregard risk 
management altogether. So my claim is that even if we admit that top man-
agement may figure as a plural subject, it would be too hasty to conclude 
that this shows that the directors of a firm form a plural subject in relation 
to the specific value of prioritizing profit over risk management.
It is instructive to compare the relationship between profit taking and 
risk management with that between profit taking and concern for the environ-
ment. The businessperson interested in profit at the expense of the environ-
ment is unfortunately a very real possibility. This is due to the fact that a 
concern for the environment is a genuine obstacle to making profit. 
Environmental care restricts the number of options you have, and as such 
potentially imposes costs on business.22 Profit making and risk management 
are in an entirely different relationship, however. The first and foremost prin-
ciple in finance is that expected risk and expected return are related. If you 
22. I’m not here denying the relevance of the long- term view in which a surviving planet earth 
is a necessary condition for conducting business. If a business destroys commodities needed to do 
business, concern for the commodities coincides with a concern for profit. The point here is that 
businesspeople caring for the environment will reduce the number of their options. Eliminating 
options never increases expected utility, and potentially decreases it.
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invest in something more risky, you require that the expected return is going 
to be higher, because otherwise you would invest the same amount of money 
in something that bears less risk, but has the same expected return.23
 This means that you cannot sensibly discuss strategies to maximize 
(expected) profit without discussing risk. Inadequate risk management therefore 
on average leads not to profits, but to unacceptably many and/or unacceptably 
large losses, and that is why at the level of top management the importance 
of risk management should not be in dispute.
Now clearly bank directors may for all sorts of reasons ignore risk manage-
ment. They may come from the commercial side of the firm and import a general 
dislike of risk managers. They may have personal stakes in ignoring these risks 
because of incentives created by erroneously designed remuneration packages. Or 
CEOs may falsely believe that their supposedly high level of expertise allows them 
to set aside the work of the Chief Risk Officer, who operates further down the 
board’s hierarchy. Even in such cases, however, there is no plural subject of the 
relevant kind. There is no joint commitment among directors to ignore or downplay 
the importance of risk management. Rather, one or more members are individually 
committed to, for instance, gaming the system for their own personal benefit. Such 
directors do not jointly subscribe to a corporate goal (of prioritizing profit making 
over risk management). They probably assign no value to any corporate goals 
whatsoever. They are only interested in their own private monetary gains, and to 
the extent that this leads to harm, they are at most individually responsible.
3.2 Discursive Dilemmas
A device used more frequently than plural subjects in arguments about col-
lective responsibility is that of the so- called discursive dilemma. Authors such 
as Philip Pettit (2007) and David Copp (2006) have used it to defend concepts 
of collective or corporate responsibility.24 Among the ambitions these and other 
authors have with the discursive dilemma is to gain deeper insight in collective 
responsibility in real- life cases. Pettit, for instance, starts an influential article 
with the tragic case of the Herald of Free Enterprise disaster in the Belgian 
harbor of Zeebrugge. So, it is only natural to consider the potential role of 
the discursive dilemma in arguments about the global financial crisis.
The traditional setup of a discursive dilemma is one in which three members 
of a committee have to vote (yes or no) on three premises that are all necessary 
and sufficient for a policy to be implemented.25 The dilemma arises out of the 
fact that while individually each committee member believes that only two of 
the three conditions are satisfied, each condition obtains a yes vote from two of 
23. It is essential that in finance the risk of a particular asset is measured by its volatility rather 
than its expected payoff. Volatility is estimated by the standard deviation of historical returns of 
the asset.
24. It goes back at least as far as to Kornhauser and Sager (1986).
25. Pettit (2007) considers four propositions, but three are sufficient to get a three- person 
dilemma.
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the three members. As a result, no member individually backs the policy, but 
each of the premises is backed by a majority of two. Since the decision rule 
used by the committee is stipulated to be such that it only requires majorities 
for the premises (a premise-based decision rule), the policy is implemented. Suppose 
now that some harm or wrong results from the policy’s being implemented. Who 
is responsible? Pettit argues that it can’t be the individual committee members, 
because each voted individually against the policy. So if you want to complain, 
you “can only blame the [committee] as a whole” (Pettit 2007).
Pettit’s conclusion can be criticized on several grounds, but I’m going 
to assume here that he is right, and that whenever such “voids” of individual 
responsibility arise, they show that collective responsibility is at least possible.26 
In other words, it is particularly in situations such as the discursive dilemma 
that individuals lose, and collectives gain, moral responsibility. Yet I show 
that such situations are rare, particularly in finance.
The primary reason why discursive dilemmas are unlikely to arise in financial 
decision making is that most organizational decision making in real life is in boards, 
committees, or teams involving more subtle and fine- grained input from individual 
members than the binary yes or no vote. This point by itself is not decisive. Carl 
Andreas Claussen and Øistein Røisland (2010a) show that quantitative input gener-
ates discursive dilemmas just as easily. Their example is drawn from corporate 
finance. The board of a company votes on the question of whether to implement 
some policy. Each of the three members has personal estimates of two relevant 
measures: (i) the amount of money the policy would bring into the company (or 
more precisely, the discounted cash flow [DCF] of the project), and (ii) the costs 
incurred to start and realize the project (investment costs, IC). Given these two 
measures, the so- called net present value is calculated by subtracting the second 
from the first (NPV = DCF − IC). A project’s NPV is a crucial measure frequently 
used in all sorts of business decision making. As a general rule, if several projects 
can be chosen, the one with the greatest NPV must be chosen.





Net present value (NPV)
A 10 8 2
B 10 11 −1
C 13 12 1
Median 10 11 Premise- based Conclusion- based
−1 1
What NPV should the board “as a whole” assign to the project? This 
depends on two things. One is how the individual estimates of DCF and IC 
are aggregated into a board estimate. Claussen and Røisland use the median 
26. One problem is that Pettit’s argument seems to presuppose a principle that if some harm 
happens as the result of human activities or decisions, there must be someone or something that 
can be blamed. This is dubious in the context of finance, as I briefly note in the conclusion of this 
article.
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of the individual estimates. Then, for the board, DCF = 10 and IC = 11, as 
shown in the bottom row of the table. The other issue is whether the board 
calculates the estimated NPV of the project based on these two figures (a premise-
based decision), or applies the aggregation procedure (in this case, the median) 
to the values of the NPVs induced by the three individual estimates of DCF 
and IC (a conclusion-based decision). Following the premise- based procedure, 
the board’s estimate would be NPV = −1, whereas the conclusion- based proce-
dure would lead to NPV = 1. My argument proceeds on the assumption that 
whenever discursive dilemmas arise, the need to postulate collective responsibility 
arises also. So if Claussen and Røisland offer a plausible model of corporate 
decision making, to demonstrate collective responsibility for the global financial 
crisis only requires us to demonstrate one or more relevant discursive dilemmas. 
Yet there are two reasons why we should expect to find only a few such dilem-
mas. The first is that the example heavily depends on the fact that the aggrega-
tion procedure or decision rule is defined in terms of the median. As soon as 
the board switches to the mathematically more tractable mean (average), the 
dilemma disappears entirely.27 I do not want to deny that some boards may 
have reasons to aggregate individual votes using the median rather than the 
arithmetic mean. But it strikes me as highly artificial in most contexts.
But secondly, even if boards aggregated through the median, in many cases 
the difference between the premise- based and the conclusion- based estimate will 
be very small or nil. This has to do with an assumption that generally underlies 
the discursive dilemma: that no board member is a “dictator.” Consider a deci-
sion rule F that turns the individual estimates or judgments g1,…, gn of n board 
members into a board estimate or judgment F(g1,…, gn). Then, F is dictatorial 
if there is some i such that F(g1,…, gn) = gi for any combination of estimates 
g1,…, gn. To assume that the decision rule isn’t dictatorial may have some plau-
sibility in environments where decision making is heavily regulated.28 Board rooms 
are, however, a very different kind of environment. They are often dominated 
by a CEO that comes close to having dictatorial influence on the firm. Economists 
and business scholars have garnered sufficient evidence that the influence of 
CEOs on a number of output variables of their firms is much larger than we 
should expect if board decisions were the result of applying aggregate decision 
rules giving rather more equal weight to all board members.
Let me explain. Board meetings cannot in most cases be publicly scrutinized. 
But what can be done is to examine the extent to which particular characteristics 
of a firm’s CEO explain firm behavior. These characteristics involve the remunera-
tion package the CEO receives, certain psychological traits (for instance, the “big 
five” core personality traits: extraversion, emotional stability, agreeableness, consci-
entiousness, openness to experience).29 What researchers consistently find is that these 
27. For the (arithmetic) mean, it is true that the difference between two means equals the 
mean of the differences.
28. In another article, Claussen and Røisland (2010b) argue that this applies to monetary 
policy making.
29. See, e.g., Abatecola, Mandarelli, and Poggesi (2013) for a survey of the literature.
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and similar CEO characteristics explain a fair share of the amount of risk a firm 
takes, its leverage ratio, the proportion of equity and debt by which the firm is 
financed, the interest rates the firm pays on its loans, its credit rating, and so forth.30
I don’t have space to develop my criticism of the discursive dilemma much 
further.31 The plausibility of my claim is, however, underscored by an observa-
tion about law and regulation: a large part of corporate governance regulation 
is meant precisely to make decision making in boards less dictatorial.32
 In sum, many plural subjects may form in finance, but few will explicitly 
value prioritizing profit making over risk management. Moreover, collective decision 
making in finance may sometimes assume discursive dilemma form, but the paradox 
between premise- based and conclusion- based decision making doesn’t manifest itself 
but in rare occasions. Here, too, then the conclusion must be that with some few 
exceptions, no one is morally responsible for the global financial crisis.33
4. MUST THERE BE SOMEONE TO BLAME?
That (almost) no one is morally responsible for the crisis may not only strike 
some readers as implausible. It may also create some frustration: if no one 
is morally responsible, whom should we blame?
My conclusion leads to such frustration if you embrace the principle that 
if something bad happens as the result of human actions or decisions, someone 
30. See Bernile, Bhagwat, and Rau (2017) for a striking recent example. This article shows 
that CEO experiences with catastrophes during early life predict the amount of risk their firms 
take. The article offers a neurological explanation for the mechanism through which particular 
disaster experiences determine a person’s attitude toward risk. For present purposes, this 
mechanism is unimportant. What is important is the observation that it is the CEO’s attitude 
toward risk (and not a “collective” attitude toward risk determined through discursive dilemma 
type decision procedures) that accounts for (the variation in) these output variables.
31. It is important to note that the existence of “dictatorial” CEOs is compatible with highly 
formalized decision rules. The inordinate influence of CEOs on managerial decisions may be 
exercised prior to voting in a discursive dilemma setting: whenever CEOs successfully persuade 
other members to follow their vote, a nondictatorial decision rule will still yield dictatorial 
decisions. Clearly, if the CEO has the power to persuade a majority of members, no “responsibility 
void” will arise. It is not difficult to show mathematically that, with increasing influence of CEOs 
on other board members prior to voting, discursive dilemmas are less likely to occur.
32. An interesting example here is the prohibition in the United Kingdom of CEO duality, 
that is, of one person assuming both the role of CEO and of chairman (in charge of the nonexecutive 
part of the board). In so- called two-tiered boards, an executive board carries out daily decision 
making, monitored by the nonexecutive or supervisory board. This model is popular in several 
continental European countries. In the United States and the United Kingdom, there is only one 
board, which has executive and nonexecutive members. The CEO is the main executive; the 
chairman the main nonexecutive. It’s easy to speculate that one- tiered boards offer more 
opportunities for dictatorship than two- tiered boards.
33. This brings us back to individual responsibility: CEOs wield great power over organizations, 
mostly for the good, but sometimes for the bad. Whether some of them are individually responsible for 
the global financial crisis depends on empirical details that I can’t go into now. But it would surprise me 
if after close inspection of these details no board member would have to be held responsible.
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must be blamed. This principle may be plausible in a large range of homely 
cases. But it is entirely unclear whether it makes sense in the context of finance.34
I will not come back to that and only deal with another objection. It is to 
the effect that I’m ignoring the institutional background of finance. Laws, regula-
tions, and conventions may determine when the preconditions of moral responsibility 
hold, because they shape the causal connections and the available alternatives that 
market participants have. I am keenly aware of this, and I believe that observa-
tions about how moral responsibility is distributed given a particular institutional 
framework can inform debates about how these institutions might be changed. 
Here is an example. Bubbles and crises typically arise in situations where inves-
tors have suboptimal information concerning the fundamental value of assets. Some 
information is disseminated through price. A rise in a price of an asset indicates 
ceteris paribus that expected future cash flows have increased. On a simple under-
standing, one investor obtains information about a new technology to be developed 
by a company. She expects the company to become more profitable, and decides 
to buy stock in the company, thereby marginally raising its price, and the more 
investors become aware of the news, the greater this effect will be.
For a price accurately to reflect the fundamental value of an asset, it is 
essential that all relevant bits of information are disseminated through price; and 
it is the institutional background that determines whether such information is avail-
able. Here is a slightly stylized example. Distinguish investors that are “optimistic” 
and “pessimistic,” respectively, concerning some asset. An optimist wants to buy 
the asset. A pessimist wants to sell it. Optimists can keep on buying the assets as 
long as they have money, but unless the pessimists can sell short, the possibilities 
for disseminating pessimistic views through price stops as soon as they have sold 
all their assets. (A pessimist selling short would borrow the shares from someone, 
and then sell them to an optimist. The pessimist would need to give them back 
to the lender at a specified point in time, but if the pessimistic scenario material-
izes, she will simply buy them at a lower price than she first sold them, and then 
give them back to the lender.)
Short selling puts optimists and pessimists on an equal footing, and a 
result of this is that bubbles will be less pronounced—or are even prevented 
from starting. Yet many jurisdictions have strict rules against short selling, 
and a great majority of institutional investors have internal regulations against 
short selling in place (Hong and Stein 2003). In sum, regulators could ensure 
that fewer market participants become morally responsible for bursting a bub-
ble by allowing pessimists to sell short.35 Sometimes deregulation does help.
34. See, for example Davies (2010).
35. Even where short selling is possible, it may still be hard for pessimists to bring their beliefs to the 
market. In such markets as real estate, art, wine, and so on. it is difficult to short sell, even if it is legal. A 
solution may be the introduction of indices. Gary Gorton (2010), for instance, argues that the 
introduction of the ABX index in 2006, an index for asset- backed securities, helped bring about the 
subprime mortgage meltdown. Had that index been there a decade earlier, there might not have been a 
bubble in the first place. A potential problem is, as Tom Sorell has pointed out (personal communication), 
that short selling pessimists may create pessimism in other market participants. The extent to which this 
harms them is, however, hard to determine on the basis of existing empirical research.
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Let me turn back to the principle that if something bad happens someone 
must be blamed. I only want to discuss an example that, hopefully, helps casting 
doubt on its applicability to finance. The example involves swap agreements between 
banks the price of which exploded in the week after the collapse of Lehman Brothers 
in September 2008. A swap agreement is a contract to the effect that you and I 
swap cash flows. For instance, we could agree that I will pay you a fixed interest 
rate of 3 percent on $1 million, and that you pay me a variable interest rate on $1 
million, amounting to the LIBOR rate plus half a percent. Similarly, we might swap 
our exposure to the risk that, for instance, a certain company goes bankrupt. If I 
have lent money to that company, it might be interesting to me to pay you some 
amount of money until some point in time in exchange for the right to be paid back 
(by you) my loan to that company in case it goes bust (plus remaining interest).
Anecdotal evidence has it that in the week after Lehman Brothers went 
bankrupt, the largest US investment banks bought credit default swaps that 
would protect them against the risk of other investment banks going bust. 
This made perfect sense. In fact, it would have been utterly irresponsible not 
to insure themselves against these dangers: if ever it made sense to buy credit 
default swaps, then surely it was so in the week that started the global financial 
crisis. But the aggregate result of this was that the market for credit default 
swaps exploded, exacerbating rather than dampening the turmoil. Whom should 
we blame? I believe we should accept that no one can sensibly be blamed.36,37
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